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EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: STUDY OF A DECISIONAL
PROBLEM ARISING IN THE TERMINAL
STAGES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
MICHAEL B. LAVINSKY*
PREFACE
THIS PAPER UNDERTAKES an examination of the executive power
of clemency as a decisional problem in the terminal stages of
the criminal process. Because the dimensions of the subject are so
broad, it is necessary to confine this paper to a limited scope.
Therefore, the focus will be upon the exercise of the executive
power of commutation of capital sentences in Illinois during the
incumbency of Governor Otto Kerner. It is felt that such a limited
approach will most readily lend itself to analysis, evaluation, and
perhaps some tentative conclusions.
After setting forth the nature, purposes, and administration
of clemency, this paper will then study in detail recent Illinois
cases relating to commutation of the death sentence. The ulti-
mate purpose is to observe and derive some insight into the various
considerations-the influences and impulses, the pressures and re-
sponses-which seem to bear upon an executive decision in exer-
cise of the clemency power.
Throughout much of the literature dealing with the subject
of executive clemency, the term "pardon" is used synonymously
with the term "clemency." This paper will attempt to avoid such
undesirable confusion of fundamental terminology by employing
the more properly accurate term "clemency" as a generic concept
of executive discretion which inherently includes the powers of
pardon, commutation, and reprieve.
This paper has attempted to avoid "amateur forays into the
behavioral sciences." Nevertheless, the concern is with dynamics
rather than mechanics. Such approach involves an amalgam of
source material drawn not only from legal literature, but also from
"field investigation."
* A.B. cum laude, Tufts University, 1962; J.D., University of Chicago Law School,
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With respect to the latter, this writer should like to proffer
due credits to Judge George N. Leighton, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Criminal Division; to John D. Callaway, Director of Pub-
lic Affairs, WBBM, CBS Radio, Chicago; to Jason Bellows, Chicago
attorney; and to Elmer Gertz, also a Chicago attorney. These indi-
viduals-along with the Chicago office of the Governor and the
State Parole and Pardon Board-have been generous in their co-
operation. Their important contributions to this study are there-
fore appreciatively acknowledged.
PART I
The power of pardoning Offenses is inseparably incident to the
Crown; and this High Prerogative the King is entrusted with upon
a special confidence, that he will spare those only whose Case, could
it be foreseen, the Law itself may be presumed willing to have ex-
cepted out of its general Rules which the Wisdom of Man cannot
possibly make so perfect as to suit every particular Case.
. . . Francis Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law.
INTRODUCTION: THE CLEMENCY CONCEPT
Most societies have felt the need to inject flexibility into the
administration of criminal justice by providing a broad discretion-
ary power of executive clemency.' Perhaps in an ideal society,
where all laws are just and perfect in their operation, the insti-
tution of clemency should be unnecessary. But this is an imperfect
world.
The criminal law can only deal with general patterns of anti-
social behavior. It can never take into account every conceivable
situation which may occur in the diverse circumstances of life. Nor
is the application of the criminal law by the courts necessarily wise
or correct in any given case. Therefore, our institutional machin-
ery permits executive reconsideration of a penal sentence pro-
nounced in the judicial process.
The power of executive clemency exists then as a device to
afford relief from undue severity or apparent error in the applica-
tion of the criminal law, as a device for tempering justice with
mercy by allowing for a consideration of the totality of circum-
1 See generally, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 3 Attorney General's Survey of Release Proce-
dures-Pardon (1939). This pilot study represents an exhaustive treatment of the law
relating to executive clemency.
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stances which may properly mitigate guilt. Entrusted to the execu-
tive for exercise in special cases, the concept of clemency "repre-
sents the sense of human weakness, the recognition of human
fallibility, the cry of human compassion. It is a confession of im-
perfect wisdom....2
ENGLISH BACKGROUND AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
The concept of executive clemency in the United States de-
rives from our English heritage. In England the power of clemency
developed as a royal prerogative of the Crown. The King was con-
sidered the fountain of justice, and as a corollary of his power to
punish he could exercise the prerogative of extending mercy to
those who breached the peace.
The English conception of clemency was transplanted to the
American colonies, where its use by the authorities was regarded
as a delegation of the royal prerogative. This view, however, was
superseded after American independence by the notion that the
power of clemency was inherent in the people, as sovereign. Thus,
while the power of clemency is historically presented as an attri-
bute of the Crown, or the executive, in the United States the right
to dispense mercy is recognized as vested in the people, to be dele-
gated as they in their sovereign wisdom please.
"The clemency power is neither inherently nor necessarily
an executive power, but is a power of government inherent in the
people, who may by constitutional provision place its exercise in
any official, board, or department of government they choose." 3
In practice, it has been found most convenient to confer the power
upon the executive branch of government. Thus, under the United
States Constitution the clemency power in federal cases is delegated
to the President; 4 and practically all the state constitutions have
delegated this power in state criminal cases to the governor, either
alone or in conjunction with advisors. 5
While most of the states originally conferred the clemency
2 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 178 & n.146 (1964),
citing Smithers, Executive Clemency in Pennsylvania 61 (1909).
3 Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 634, 228 Pac. 82, 87 (1924).
4 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. See generally, Humbert, The Pardoning Power of the
President (1941).
5 See generally, Jensen, The Pardoning Power in the American States (1922).
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power upon the governor alone, the more recent trend has been
to establish advisory boards to make recommendations to the gov-
ernor as to the exercise of clemency in individual cases.
• . . At one period in our history, the (clemency) power was vested
almost exclusively in the governor. But new administrative duties
placed upon him, and also an increase of requests for clemency...
made it impossible for him to give the detailed attention to
clemency problems which was demanded. Added to these reasons
was the feeling . . . that some executives had administered their
power with such laxness that the system needed further regulation
and safeguarding."
ILLINOIS PRACTICE
In Illinois, as in all states, there are prescribed rules which
govern the practice and procedure of the clemency authority.
These are embodied in the State Constitution,7 statutes,' and in
regulations formulated by the clemency authority.9 In Illinois,
the State Parole and Pardon Board acts as the governor's agent in
hearing applications for the various forms of executive clemency.
For the purpose of receiving and considering evidence relative to
the granting of clemency, it is the practice of this seven-member
board to hold public hearings on clemency applications four times
a year, as required by law.
The Parole and Pardon Board acts merely in an advisory ca-
pacity to the governor. It has no power to grant clemency; it can
only, after thorough deliberation, submit a recommendation to
the governor. The governor is free to accept or reject the recom-
mendation of the board. Under his constitutional authority, he
takes final discretionary action and assumes full responsibility
therefor. 10
One of the most intense responsibilities of the governor of the State
of Illinois is the problem of clemency.... The Parole and Pardon
Board can and does make recommendations .... However, in the
final analysis, the decision is, and properly should be the gov-
ernor's ....
6 Id. at 23.
7 See Appendix I.
8 See Appendix II.
9 See Appendix III.
10 For a recent discussion of the Illinois governor's constitutional power of clemency,
see People v. Kinney, 30 Ill. 2d 201, 195 N.E.2d 651 (1964).
11 Gov. Stratton, Report on Leopold Decision (July 30, 1957).
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
FUNDAMENTAL TERMINOLOGY
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the various deci-
sional considerations relating to the exercise of the clemency
power, it would seem appropriate to undertake a brief definitional
survey. This paper is employing the term "executive clemency"
as a generic concept of discretion which inherently includes the
powers of pardon, commutation, and reprieve.
Pardon is an executive act of grace, relieving the individual
upon whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law prescribes
for the crime of which he has been convicted. 2
A pardon may be full or partial. A full pardon freely absolves
the party from all legal consequences, direct and collateral, of his
conviction. It releases the offender from the entire punishment
prescribed for the offense, and from all the disabilities consequent
upon his conviction. It fully avoids or terminates punishment for
a crime. A partial pardon, however, remits only a portion of the
punishment or absolves from only portions of the legal conse-
quences attendant upon the crime and conviction.
A pardon may be unconditional or conditional. An uncon-
ditional pardon frees the convicted party from criminal liabilities
without any conditions whatsoever. A conditional pardon, on the
other hand, is operative only upon the performance of certain stip-
ulated conditions which have been annexed. Any condition prece-
dent or subsequent may be imposed that is not illegal, immoral,
or impossible of performance. 3
Whereas pardon (and amnesty' 4) possess certain exculpatory
effects, commutation and reprieve do not. Most state constitutions
specifically include in the clemency power the authority to grant
commutations and reprieves. And in those states whose constitu-
tions do not specifically so provide, it is held that such exercises
12 See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833), and Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307
(1856). For a discussion of the legal effects of a pardon, see 3 Attorney General's Survey
of Release Procedures-Pardon ch. IX (1939).
13 3 Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures-Pardon 198-199 (1939).
14 Sometimes inaccurately referred to as a "general" pardon, amnesty is a sovereign
act of oblivion, usually applied in forgiveness of political offenses, such as treason, sedition
or rebellion. Amnesty is usually general, addressed to classes, or even communities. Pardon,
on the other hand, is employed in cases of infractions of the ordinary criminal laws of the
state and applies only to the individual, relieving him from the punishment inflicted by
the law for his specific offense. See id., ch. VIII.
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of mercy are included in the pardon provision, for the reason that
the greater power necessarily includes the lesser power. 5
While pardon avoids or terminates punishment, a commuta-
tion merely substitutes a milder punishment in place of that im-
posed by the court. It refers to a mitigation of punishment.'
The power of commutation is exercised in many cases to re-
duce the length of imprisonment and thereby make eligible for
parole prisoners not otherwise eligible.
17
The question has been raised whether the power to mitigate
punishment includes the power to change the nature and character
of the punishment, as by the usual practice of substituting life
imprisonment for the death sentence. The United States Supreme
Court held in Biddle v. Perovich5 that inasmuch as life imprison-
ment is generally understood to be a less severe penalty than death,
such a substitution is therefore a proper commutation.
Reprieve is a respite, a suspension of the execution of the sen-
tence of the court.19 It neither reduces the punishment nor changes
its substance. It does no more than postpone the execution of the
sentence, and after termination of the period of reprieve the full
sentence may be carried out.
Reprieves are granted to afford a convicted party the opportu-
nity to obtain some amelioration of the sentence imposed upon
him. The most important use of a reprieve arises in capital cases,
where it is used to stay the execution of the death penalty, pending
action on application for pardon or commutation."
15 Id. at 195.
16 Id. at 209 et seq.
17 It is doubtful whether this is a legitimate exercise of the power of commutation in
Illinois. See People v. Jenkins, 322 Ill. 33, 152 N.E. 549 (1926).
18 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
19 See 3 Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures-Pardon 221 et seq. (1939).
20 The power of the courts to temporarily suspend sentence by a "stay of execution"
pending appeal or other procedural remedies should not be confused with reprieves,
which are an exercise of the power of executive clemency.
Note that while probation and parole are somewhat related to conditional pardon,
they are concepts not properly within the purview of executive clemency. Probation is a
judicial suspension of the prescribed punishment. Parole is a conditional release granted a
convict before the expiration of his prison term.
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PART II
In any capital case there can be no easy decision. Every possible
factor must be evaluated before a final decision is made.
• . . Governor Otto Kerner, Crump Clemency Statement.
THE DECISIONAL PROBLEM
Having set forth the theoretical and structural framework
necessary for an understanding of the dynamics of clemency ad-
ministration, this paper now turns toward an examination of the
exercise of clemency as a decisional problem. What considerations
are relevant to a clemency determination? What discernible reasons
or standards appear to influence the governor? What motives? What
attitudinal impulses? What factor-patterns emerge as determinant?
Montesquieu thought this "a point more easily felt than pre-
scribed. "21
It seems reasonable to suggest that the reasons for awarding
clemency may vary with changes in social conditions, with advance-
ment in thought on penal questions, and with periodic changes in
government personnel. Circumstances which one governor may
consider unconvincing, another governor may consider persuasive,
and indeed determinant, relative to an exercise of clemency in a
particular instance.
However, the exploratory concern here is with four capital
cases in Illinois, each involving an application for commutation
during the administration of Governor Otto Kerner. Of the four
applications, one was granted, two were denied, and one is cur-
rently pending as of this writing. For reference purposes, brief
case histories of these four convicted Chicago murderers next fol-
lows. Then, an attempt will be made to delineate and analyze those
discernible decisional factors which would seem to relate to the
exercise of the clemency power in the four referent cases.
VINCENT CIUCCI
Ciucci was a Chicago grocer who was convicted and ultimately
executed for the 1953 murder of his wife and three children. The
21 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Law, Book 6, ch. 21, cited in DiSalle, Comments on
Capital Punishment and Clemency, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 71, 74 (1964).
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victims were found dead in a burning building with bullet wounds
in their heads.
Three consecutive trials were held in the Criminal Court of
Cook County. The first was for the murder of Ciucci's wife; he
was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. The
second trial was for the murder of one of his daughters; the de-
fendant was again found guilty and this time given forty-five years.
The third trial was for the murder of his son; again, Ciucci was
found guilty, but this time he was sentenced to death.' The con-
viction and death sentence was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court, 3 and then by the United States Supreme Court. 4
The Supreme Court had granted certiorari to consider Ci-
ucci's claim that by bringing three separate trials under separate
indictments, and by obtaining repeated convictions upon the same
evidence, the state sought merely to harass him until it achieved
the desired capital verdict. The precise question thus presented
was whether due process was offended by separate and successive
trials for each offense occasioned by a single occurrence, when each
offense rests precisely upon the same evidence and when each
trial is free from error.
The conviction was affirmed per curiam. The Court saw no
violation of due process since the "State was constitutionally en-
titled to prosecute these individual offenses singly at separate trials,
and to utilize therein all relevant evidence.... .2 The Court
refused to consider a number of articles appearing in Chicago
newspapers after the first and second trials attributing to the
prosecuting attorney expressions of extreme dissatisfaction with
the sentences fixed by the juries and of a determination to prose-
cute until the death sentence was obtained. The reason ascribed
was that neither the articles nor their content were included in
the record.26
After dismissal of a petition under the Illinois Post-Convic-
22 Under Illinois law at the time, each murder constituted a separate crime, and
evidence of the entire occurrence was relevant in each of the three prosecutions.
23 People v. Ciucci, 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956).
24 Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
25 Id. at 573.
26 Commentary on the Ciucci case may be found in: 44 A.B.A.J. 771 (1958); 8 De Paul
L. Rev. 102 (1958); 19 Md. L. Rev. 127 (1959); 35 N.D.L. Rev. 72 (1959); 26 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 326 (1959); 1958 U. Ill. L.F. 472 (1958); 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109 (1958).
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tion Hearing Act, 27 Ciucci's attorney, George Leighton, petitioned
the Governor for commutation of the death sentence, primarily
upon the ground of oppressive unfairness resulting from the suc-
cessive prosecutions. The prayer for clemency was denied, and
Ciucci was executed March 23, 1962.
PAUL CRUMP
Paul Crump was convicted and sentenced to death for the
1953 slaying of a plant guard during an armed robbery at a packing
plant in the Chicago Stockyards. Crump's first trial in the Criminal
Court of Cook County was reversed and remanded because of prej-
udicial error.2" At the second trial, Crump was again found guilty
and sentenced to death. This time the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed. 29 Crump then initiated habeas corpus proceedings to
determine whether his constitutional rights had been violated
through the use of an allegedly coerced confession. He was denied
a writ
8 0
The Crump commutation case attracted widespread comment
and controversy, for the grounds urged .by attorneys Donald Page
Moore and Louis Nizer were unique and unprecedented: com-
plete rehabilitation during the years spent in Cook County Jail
awaiting execution. On August 1, 1962, two days prior to the
scheduled execution date, Governor Kerner commuted the sen-
tence imposed upon Paul Crump from death to imprisonment for
a term of 199 years, without parole. 1
JAMES DUKES (ALIAS JESSE WELCH)
Dukes was convicted and ultimately executed for the 1956
murder of a Chicago police officer in the course of a running gun
battle. There were two trials in the Criminal Court of Cook
County. At the first, Dukes was convicted of murder, with punish-
ment fixed at death. The conviction was reversed and remanded by
the Illinois Supreme Court because of the admission of prejudicial
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 et seq. (1963).
28 People v. Crump, 5 Ill. 2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615 (1955). See also 5 De Paul L. Rev.
141 (1955).
29 People v. Crump, 12 Ill. 2d 402, 147 N.E.2d 76 (1957).
30 United States ex rel. Crump v. Sain, 264 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1959); 295 F.2d 699 (7th
Cir. 1961).
31 See Appendix IV.
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evidence and because of highly prejudicial and inflammatory con-
duct on the part of the prosecutor. 2 At the new trial, Dukes was
again convicted and sentenced to death. This time the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed. 3
Habeas corpus proceedings3 4 and an appeal for commutation,
primarily on the ground of mitigating circumstance, were of no
avail. Dukes was executed August 24, 1962.
WILLIAM WITHERSPOON
Witherspoon was convicted and sentenced to death following
trial in the Criminal Court of Cook County for the 1959 murder
in Chicago of an arresting police officer. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed. 5 Witherspoon subsequently petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, but he was unsuccessful in that proceeding.36
A petition for commutation, based primarily upon rehabilita-
tion and mitigating circumstances, has been prepared by Attorney
Elmer Gertz,37 with request that the hearing be held in abeyance
pending the exhaustion of further judicial remedies.3
EXAMINATION OF DECISIONAL FACTORS
What decisional factors are relevant to an exercise of the clem-
ency power, particularly with reference to commutation in capital
cases?
The clemency power is generally regarded as one in which
there should be free exercise of discretion by the clemency author-
ity.3 9 It is thought that each case should be individually determined
solely upon its merits, that it is impossible to develop uniform rules
and standards of general application. So much depends upon the
32 People v. Dukes, 12 111. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 48 (1957). See 60 W. Va. L. Rev. 375
(1958).
33 People v. Dukes, 19 Ill. 2d 532, 169 N.E.2d 84 (1960).
34 United States ex rel. Dukes v. Sain, 297 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1962).
35 People v. Witherspoon, 27 111. 2d 483, 190 N.E.2d 281 (1963).
36 United States ex rel. Witherspoon v. Ogilvie, 337 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1964).
37 See Appendix V.
38 There is a general understanding that inasmuch as a clemency hearing is a court of
last resort and the clemency process is extra-judicial in nature, the clemency hearing
should await the completion of judicial proceedings. Executive Clemency in Capital Cases,
39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 152 (1964).
39 The criminal law has been described as "an island of technicality in a sea of
discretion." See Scott, The Pardoning Power, 284 Annals 95 (1952), reprinted in Newman,
Sourcebook on Probation, Parole and Pardon 41 (1958).
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individual characteristics of each petitioner and the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime in each
case.
40
Indeed, it must be recognized that one must be somewhat
chary of making definitive assertions when discussing decisional
criteria relative to the exercise of the discretionary power of exec-
utive clemency. Reasons for a decision in any given case are often
difficult to ascertain. The decision of the governor is a function of
multifarious and variegated stimuli.
It may be further conceded that there are motivating forces
which influence the governor to extend clemency, but which are
not by him assigned as reasons for so acting. Various subjective
attitudinal impulses may bear upon the governor's ultimate deci-
sion-various unarticulated and undefinable personal views, sym-
pathies, biases, and a host of homogenized visceral reactions and
individual estimates.
What differences emerge as between the cases of those who
suffer the full extent of the law through death, and those who have
enjoyed the privilege of executive reconsideration and retraction
of the originally imposed capital sentence? Admitting due regard
for the aforementioned caveat, this paper will now essay an exami-
nation of those fundamental decisional factors which would seem
to relate to the discretionary exercise of executive clemency in
the four referent Illinois capital cases.
DOUBTS AS TO GuILT-IMPRESSIONS OF COURT TREATMENT
Most clemency authorities are alert to the possibilities of an
erroneous conviction, and they may make inquiry into the exis-
tence of new, ignored, suppressed, or underdeveloped evidence.
And they apparently regard the fairness of the police treatment
and of the judicial proceedings as somewhat of a consideration in
their decision. However, these would seem to be relatively infre-
quent grounds for commutation, for there is an extreme hesitancy
to "retry" the case.
41
In the Paul Crump clemency hearing,42 attorney Louis Nizer
40 Jensen, The Pardoning Power in the American States 101 (1922).
41 See Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 160-161 (1964).
42 Much of the information concerning the Crump clemency hearing has been derived
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took extreme pain to emphasize in his opening statement that there
would be no questioning of the police practices and no challenge
to the judicial determination. Indeed, it was admitted in the peti-
tion for executive clemency that Paul Crump was fairly tried and
convicted, having received the full process of law accorded by our
judicial system. The issue was to be confined solely to the question
of rehabilitation as a basis for commutation of the death sentence.48
However, in the clemency petition for Witherspoon, there ap-
pears to be serious challenge to the circumstances surrounding his
confession and to the composition and verdict of the jury." Thus,
the two cases present somewhat of a contrast as to the relative pro-
priety and advisability of challenging the administration of crimi-
nal justice in any given case.
In the Dukes petition the possibility was suggested that it
was not Dukes, but in fact another pursuing officer, who shot the
policeman.
And in the Ciucci case, the clemency appeal was based pri-
marily upon the unjustness of the successive prosecutions. George
Leighton, Ciucci's state-appointed attorney, has indicated that
while it is best to avoid "rehashing" the issue of guilt or innocence,
it is proper to urge that some factor has impeded the ultimate
justice which the case merits.
Because of the disinclination to "retry" the case and challenge
the judicial process, "the reluctance to override the decision of




In some cases there may exist certain extenuating circum-
stances surrounding the commission of the crime. Examples are
self-defense, provocation, duress, and necessity. These factors may
from a full tape-recorded account of the proceedings, generously provided by John
Callaway of WBBM, CBS Radio, Chicago.
43 In point of fact there was some doubt as to the "voluntariness" of Crump's con-
fession, but for various reasons it was not considered politic to urge this factor in the
clemency appeal.
44 See Appendix V.
45 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 187 (1964). See also
Appendix II, § 10; Appendix III, § 9.
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properly ,be considered in examining the totality of circumstances
attendant upon any given case.
46
Voluntary confession of the crime, guilty plea, and coopera-
tion with the state may also be factors of some influence in arriving
at a clemency decision.
On the other hand, the nature of the crime might operate as
somewhat of a countervailing consideration. How vicious was the
crime, how offensive to the community? Certainly the more hei-
nous the crime, the less chance for clemency. Cases involving child
molestation resulting in homicide, rape-murder, "cop-killing," mu-
tilation, torture, and planned assassination are representative of
those types of crimes which would seem to represent a relatively
unfavorable case for executive clemency.47 In this respect it might
be noted that Ciucci was convicted for the nighttime murder of
his wife and three children, Dukes and Witherspoon for the mur-
der of apprehending police officers, and Crump for the murder of
a plant guard.
Mitigating circumstances surrounding the criminal act were
urged in the Dukes case, and are now being urged in the Wither-
spoon petition for clemency.
That the homicide was unplanned and spontaneous, not per-
petrated in the course of a felony, was urged as a fundamental basis
for commutation in the Dukes case. According to the account of
Dukes' attorney, Jason Bellows, Dukes became intoxicated one
night and began abusing his girlfriend in front of a small church
in Southside Chicago. Some of the church members came out, and
Dukes began shooting wildly. Two police officers came upon the
scene and attempted to apprehend Dukes; during the ensuing
pursuit one of the policemen was shot. Mr. Bellows characterizes
the homicide as a "drunken Saturday night brawl-spur of the
moment type shooting," one which lacked planning and premedi-
tation.
46 "Clemency is also occasioned if the crime was induced by others, if the victim
unduly exposed the defendant to temptation, if the homicide was a 'mercy-killing,' . . .
and if the act was a crime of necessity .... Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction 573
(1963). And in some cases the relative culpability, or directness of participation in the
homicide, may become critical to the clemency outcome. Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 163 (1964).
47 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 159 (1964).
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Attorney Bellows believes that Dukes' crime was less heinous
than Crump's, which was a felony-murder, a deliberate murder
in the course of a planned robbery. He further believes that but
for the fact that it was a police officer that was shot, Dukes would
not have been given the death sentence. Therefore, he reasons,
since Crump had only recently been granted commutation, so
then should the same mercy have been extended to Dukes. George
Leighton is apparently in accord with this view, having expressed
the opinion that with respect to mitigating circumstances Duke
certainly presented a better case than Crump, for the murder was
not committed during an act of felony.
In Witherspoon's petition for commutation, it is urged that
the shooting was not premeditated and not with malice afore-
thought; that Witherspoon was unfamiliar with the foreign-made,
mechanically imperfect weapon; and that in the process of sur-
rendering the gun to the arresting officer it went off accidentally
or as the result of panic. 48 And, as in Dukes, this was not a felony-
murder.
The factor of mitigating circumstances may also arise from
certain social characteristics discernible in the individual peti-
tioner.49 Here psychological data and social history become rele-
vant. Variables such as age, sex, race, nativity, occupation, marital
status, physical and mental condition, prior character, prison
record, etc. may enter the scene. Such data may assume special im-
portance if it was not available for the trier of fact or the sen-
tencing authority.590
Consider the following hypothesis: The governor tends to
consider with special care the prayers for commutation of rela-
tively unenlightened and apparently friendless individuals, partic-
ularly those whose crimes may have been the result of sudden and
violent passion, ignorance, poverty, or unhappy surroundings;
however, the governor tends to deal less favorably with clemency
applications filed by offenders who enjoyed at the time of the crime
48 See Appendix V.
49 See Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and Commuted Among
Admissions to Death Row, reprinted in John, Savitz & Wolfgang, The Sociology of Punish-
ment and Correction 63 (1962). The purpose of this study was to analyze statistically the
social characteristics of those persons who have been sentenced to death for the crime of
murder since the introduction of the electric chair in Pennsylvania.
50 Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 166 (1964).
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a good social background, material comforts, the benefits of educa-
tion, and a happy domestic life.
PROLONGED DELAY BETWEEN SENTENCING AND EXECUTION
Our system of criminal justice harbors an ingrained resistance
to the execution of the irretrievable penalty. Appeals, new trials,
and judicial and executive orders granting stays of execution ac-
count for the wide range in elapsed periods of time between sen-
tence and execution.
There has been a great deal of concern about protracted de-
lays in carrying out the imposition of the death penalty, for there
is reason to believe that the longer the delay the greater the possi-
bility that the death penalty will never be implemented.5' An ex-
tended delay in execution of the capital sentence seems to arouse
public sentiment, often based upon the notion that the condemned
party has already "died a thousand deaths" as he awaits his fate.52
In the Ciucci, Crump, and Dukes cases, a considerable num-
ber of years elapsed between sentence and final execution date.
And now, in the Witherspoon petition, it is urged that the con-
demned man has already been subjected to the emotional equiv-
alent of the death penalty by virtue of having undergone the agony
of years in jail while awaiting execution and the further agony of
the ups and downs of legal proceedings and numerous last minute
stays of execution.
But why should the fact that through legal maneuvers several
years have elapsed result in any special bonus to the applicant for
commutation? This objection was stressed by the State's Attorney
at the Paul Crump hearings. How about those individuals who are
not able to delay their execution by various legal proceedings-
what of them? George Leighton has observed that extended delay
in execution is nothing but a windfall for the condemned individ-
ual. It is often a result of the zeal of the lawyer, and at the same
time it provides a greater opportunity for the lawyer to attract
publicity and perhaps generate various pressures upon the gov-
51 Vedder & Kay, Penology 287 (1964).
52 See Lunden, Time Lapse Between Sentence and Execution: The United States and
Canada Compared, 48 A.B.A.J. 1043 (1962). See also McIntyre, Delays in the Execution of
Death Sentences, American Bar Foundation Research Memorandum Series (1960).
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ernor--or perhaps to develop an argument for rehabilitation as a
basis for commutation. Judge Leighton believes that the "thousand
deaths" theory should be of no real importance in the clemency
determination.
DOUBTS AS TO APPROPRIATENESS OF DEATH PENALTY
The existence of capital punishment casts upon the executive
a difficult task in deciding upon the exercise of clemency. How is
he to weigh the claims of particular murderers?5
The executive may, in his discretion, consider that some deci-
sional factor renders the imposition of the extreme penalty unduly
harsh and therefore inappropriate in any given case.
Grounds for clemency may exist where popular indignation and
excitement over a widely publicized crime make calm and even-
handed consideration of the case almost impossible .... The result,
if not an actually erroneous conviction, may be an excessive and
vindictive sentence. . . . Time is a great healer; its passage lessens
the impact of a crime, and so a sentence whose severity seemed to
be justified at the time of the trial appears later to be unnecessarily
harsh.54
Furthermore, there can be little doubt but that the views of
the governor on the issue of capital punishment5 5 will have some
influence on his attitude toward the granting or denying of com-
mutation in a death penalty case."6 If the governor favors the aboli-
tion of capital punishment it would seem that he should be more
prone to commute.
An extreme example of such a tendency occurred about a half-
century ago in Oklahoma. Governor Lee Cruce (1911-1915) took
the position that capital punishment was legalized murder and
that he would therefore commute all death sentences to life im-
53 Address by Norval Morris, Chicago Maroon Forum on Capital Punishment,
University of Chicago Law School (Feb. 18, 1965).
54 Rubin, op. cit. supra note 46, at 572.
55 The exercise of clemency in death penalty cases is difficult to discuss without
adverting to the broader issue of the morality and legality of capital punishment. Interest
in capital punishment has reached its peak in this century preceding the execution of
highly controversial persons. Definite strong feelings for the retention or repeal of the
death sentence have resulted in a tremendous growth of literature on the subject.
Generally the arguments speak to the following areas: deterrence, protection, retribution,
religion, morality, social solidarity, eugenics, economics. Vedder & Kay, op. cit. supra
note 51, at 276. See also The Bitter Battle Over Capital Punishment, Look, May 7, 1963
p. 23, in which reference is made to Ciucci, Crump and Witherspoon.
56 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 175 (1964).
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prisonment. He expressed a fixed determination strictly to adhere
to this policy. The Oklahoma Supreme Court took occasion se-
verely to denounce the Governor's position.5 7 The court correctly
maintained that the Governor's conscientious scruples against
capital punishment are not a valid basis upon which to override
the legally established penal policy of the state. Private views
should not control a state officer in the performance of official
acts; public, not private motives, should prevail in any clemency
determination. The court said:
No Governor has the right to say, directly or substantially, either
by words or by actions, which speak louder than words: "I think
that capital punishment is wrong. I know that it is taught in the
Bible, and is provided for in the laws of Oklahoma; but I occupy
a higher plane than this. I am not such a barbarian as to believe
this is right. I am a better judge of what punishment should be
inflicted than is taught in the Bible, or than the ignorant, savage,
and bloodthirsty people of Oklahoma have provided for in their
laws. Therefore, notwithstanding my official oath, I will place my
judgement above the law, both human and divine, and will make
my will supreme in this state, and will not permit capital punish-
ment to be inflicted in Oklahoma, no matter what the law is, or
how atrocious the offense committed may have been ... "58
However, the court felt constrained to allow that the exercise
of discretion by the governor in clemency matters is not to be re-
viewed or interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the
theory to which the judiciary uniformly adheres:
There seems to be no right existing in the judiciary, unless granted
by competent authority or unless fraud has entered into the case,
to review or question in any way the motives or reasons upon which
the granting of any particular (clemency) has been based .... It
goes without serious question, however, that an executive has no
right, morally at least, to allow personal motives or opinions or
policy to influence his actions with respect to the granting of
(clemency), and that he should act only when justice requires it,
and when to do so would be in keeping with the dignity of his
office and with respect for the law and the decisions of the judi-
ciary, a co-ordinate branch of the government. 59
In complete contrast to the position of the Oklahoma gov-
ernor, Governor Kerner, professing the more orthodox and correct
attitude, observed in commuting Paul Crump's death sentence:
I am personally opposed to capital punishment. My personal con-
57 Henry v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 369, 136 Pac. 982 (1913).
58 Id. at 389, 136 Pac. at 990.
59 Annot., 52 L.R.A. (n.s.) 113, 114 (1914).
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victions, however, will not predetermine my actions in a request
for commutation in a capital case.60
REHABILITATION
While rehabilitation assumed no significant role in the Ciucci
and Dukes cases, it was determinant for Paul Crump, and is
currently being urged as a primary basis for commutation in the
Witherspoon case. Rehabilitation appears to be a standard for
commutation only where the condemned party has managed
through court action for a number of years to remain alive and
delay the execution. 61
At the clemency hearings for Paul Crump,' Louis Nizer, in
his brilliant opening statement, defined the issue as follows: "Is
there rehabilitation here that merits commutation of the death
sentence"? The thrust of the argument, testimony and affidavits
produced by attorneys Nizer and Moore was that rehabilitation
was a legitimate basis for commutation, and, indeed, that Crump
was in fact rehabilitated. There would be no questioning of the
police practices, no challenge to the judicial determination, no
setting forth of the origins and past of Crump. The issue joined
was whether the transformation of Crump's character was such
as to merit commutation of the death sentence.
Nizer characterized the change in Crump as a case of sincere
rehabilitation-"unique and miraculous"-a transformation only
emphasized by the fact that Crump was a "beastly, animalistic,
illiterate criminal" when convicted.
After Nizer's opening statement, Moore proceeded to call
three clergymen to testify. A Chicago Rabbi observed that the
traditional Jewish theological position favors society extending
mercy to the repenter who seeks to rehabilitate himself. And
Judaism in its modern thought favors forgiveness for the sinner
who is penitent. Then a Methodist clergyman advanced the theory
that there are two orders-the order of law and the order of grace
-and that since Crump had undergone a moral and spiritual
transformation, it would be an advancement of justice for the
60 See Appendix IV.
61 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 168 (1964).
62 Tape-recorded account, supra note 42.
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state to act in terms of grace and thereby allow Crump to continue
his self-discovery. The last of the theological testimony was offered
by a Catholic priest, who cited Pope Pius XII to advance the idea
that rehabilitation is a sufficient ground for commuting the death
sentence.
Moore next called forth Warden Clinton Duffy ("Duffy of
San Quentin"). He testified that he went to Cook County Jail,
interviewed Crump, and observed him in the course of his duties.
He concluded that Crump was not a phony, that he went about
his duties earnestly and did everything possible to help others.
He felt that Crump had eliminated his past hostility, had lost his
old resentments, and that he was no longer the resentful, vicious,
uncooperative person he once had been. Duffy suggested that
Crump could be valuable in helping to rehabilitate others in
prison, that he might assist in educational and morale-building
programs.
Finally, Moore called Father James G. Jones, of the Episcopal
Diocese of Chicago, and a leading figure in the movement to
abolish capital punishment in Illinois. Father Jones had been a
chaplain at Cook County Jail, and he knew Crump since the day
Crump had entered, in March, 1953. He was then "one of the
most frantic, hostile, dangerous men I knew." However, Father
Jones then proceeded to characterize Crump's religious and edu-
cational development, his subsequent character transformation,
as the "growth of a soul."
Father Jones cited examples of Crump's genuine progress. As
tier captain ("barn boss" in prison argot), Crump undertook to
protect the youthful and helpless from "tier creditors"; he was
known as a "stand-up" person and would not tolerate sexual or
property exploitation of those in his tier.
Crump often assisted Father Jones in his efforts to relate to
other inmates. And when Father Jones observed men with ap-
parently severe psychotic problems-possibly to the extent of com-
mitting suicide-he would have then transferred to Crump's tier
in order that they be under Crump's surveillance.
Father Jones urged that Crump's life be spared in the interest
of criminological science, so that he could be a referent, a subject
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of study, to ascertain what happened in the institution to make him
rehabilitate himself, what he himself did and how it might be
copied.
To support the contention that Crump had developed into
a social and useful force within the prison community and that
therefore his life should be preserved, Nizer then offered exerpts
from 222 pages of affidavits sworn to by fifty-seven persons who
came into close contact with Crump during his years in prison:
Hans Mattick, Assistant Warden, Cook County Jail, 1955-1958:
Crump was thirsting for knowledge and for self-betterment. He
devoured literature and even wrote a creditable book.63
Chief Nurse, Cook County Jail: Crump was in charge of the tier for
the chronically ill-diabetics, epileptics, alcoholics, etc. He was
always a gentleman. He helped the sick and positively saved at
least one life. "When I went onto the tier, Paul always made sure
that there was no cursing and that every one was decently dressed
and behaved .. "
Prison Guards: Paul settles disputes among the men; he acts as a
judge; he prevents fights. "He has some sort of special magic-he is
able to mold the men . . . and get respect from them." He is a
benefit and a good influence. He is like a scoutmaster. He has
stayed up all night helping sick prisoners and has sometimes sacri-
ficed his food for them; and he makes sure they keep clean. He
has read medical and sociological books so that he could help other
inmates. He is a priest and a social worker and a nursemaid
combined. He is definitely reformed; he counsels prisoners to go
straight when they get out, to learn from his example. He would
save men from going wrong again if he were to serve life in prison,
and therefore he would be a benefit to society.
Criminologist: Crump has transformed into a sensitive and respon-
sive human being. We would not be executing the same man who
was convicted years ago.
The State's Attorney argued against the granting of clemency,
his position essentially being that there was no genuine rehabili-
tation, and that in any event rehabilitation is not a valid basis upon
which to commute the death sentence. To support his contentions,
he called forth United States Federal District Court Judge Richard
B. Austin, who was First Assistant State's Attorney at the time
Crump was prosecuted. Judge Austin argued that there were two
Crumps: one who, when armed, held up citizens, injured people,
and killed an unarmed guard; another who, when unarmed and
in custody, was a meek, mild, clever, cunning, intelligent man,
63 Crump, Burn, Killer, Buml (1962).
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doing whatever necessary at all times to avoid the consequences
of his conduct. That, said Austin, was what he had been doing
during his time at prison. Where, asked Austin, was the remorse,
the repentance, the contrition? What was being done was an effort
to circumvent the death penalty.4
The State's Attorney next called a psychiatrist, who testified
that while Crump presented an appearance of normality and re-
ha,bilitation, it was nevertheless extremely difficult to make an
accurate assessment in the circumstances of prison incarceration.
Discussing the nature and function of executive clemency, the
State's Attorney reasoned that commutation should be granted
only in cases where guilt is questionable, the trial unfair, or the
sentence too severe. Rehabilitation, he contended, is only a proper
basis for clemency in those cases where the sentence imposed is
designed to encourage rehabilitation. Therefore, by definition, in
death cases rehabilitation is not a factor for consideration, inas-
much as the incarceration is not for that purpose.
In rejoinder, Attorney Moore characterized this as an "uncon-
scionable" doctrine, and Nizer asserted that, from 259 cited refer-
ences researched, there was no indication that the exercise of clem-
ency is limited to the grounds suggested by the State's Attorney.
Indeed, contended Nizer, rehabilitation ought to be the foremost
ground for clemency!
Apparently Governor Kerner was somewhat disturbed about
this novel argument for rehabilitation as a basis for commuting
the death sentence. He confessed his uneasiness in the following
terms:
What has troubled me is how the concept of rehabilitation can be
judged and evaluated in a case where the process of law, after the
extensive review permitted every defendant by our concern for
justice, has determined that a man committed a crime so repugnant
as to merit a sentence of death.65
Nevertheless, Governor Kerner, recognizing that "the em-
bittered, distorted man who committed a vicious murder no longer
64 "The rejection of rehabilitation arguments has often been expressed in terms of
disbelief, perhaps summed up in the words of one prison official, 'Everyone gets a little
religion on Death Row.' " Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 168
(1964).
65 See Appendix IV.
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exists," concluded that "under these circumstances, it would serve
no useful purpose to society to take this man's life."66
The element of rehabilitation has likewise assumed a sig-
nificant role in the Witherspoon petition for commutation. It is
urged that Witherspoon is so completely rehabilitated that his
execution would serve no social purpose, would outrage the public
conscience, and would discourage the principle of rehabilitation.
Witherspoon has apparently proved very effective in aiding sick
and disturbed prisoners. 7 The petition for clemency asserts that
there is substantial evidence that Witherspoon is a person of great
potentiality for social usefulness:
His intimate knowledge of crime, his powers of observation, his
articulateness, and his desire to be of public service should be
utilized in the study of ways and means of preventing crime and
rehabilitating prisoners. 68
Attorney Gertz, who prepared Witherspoon's clemency peti-
tion, believes that "this is a case where there ought to be clemency,
for the rehabilitation factor here is at least as strong as in Crump."
PUBLICITY AND PUBLIC PRESSURE
Clemency authorities maintain that publicity and community
sentiment brought to bear in various forms do not influence their
decision.
Clemency is neither to be given nor denied because some will
approve or disapprove of the action in a particular case. I am not
unmindful of the strong divergence of public opinion and of the
deluge of protests that will ensue regardless of the action taken.69
However, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, it
would seem that pressures exerted by various groups and indi-
viduals in the body politic may be a meaningful factor, especially
where the governor assumes full responsibility for the ultimate
clemency determination, as in Illinois, without benefit of insula-
tion by the Parole and Pardon Board. As an elected official, the
governor cannot remain totally impervious to energetic displays
66 Ibid.
67 See Appendix V for Witherspoon's description, in his own words, of his experiences
in Cook County Jail.
68 Ibid.
69 Gov. Stratton, Report on Leopold Decision (July 30, 1957).
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of public opinion in any given case. 70 Fundamental questions
emerge, then, as to the proper role of publicity and public pres-
sure as factors affecting a clemency determination.
Where there is a great deal of publicity attaching to a clemency
petition, the balance of public comment is often heavily in favor
of extending mercy, thereby increasing to some extent the pos-
sibility that clemency will in fact be forthcoming.71 Indeed, in the
Crump case, where an overwhelming amount of community con-
troversy was engendered,72 it seems reasonable to suggest that he
was benefited considerably by the favorable publicity and public
pressure brought to bear upon the governor."
Attorney Moore generated a huge public relations campaign
for Crump. He approached the case as a public policy question,
taking the issue of rehabilitation directly to the people through
newspaper interviews, radio and television programs, and colum-
nist Irv Kupcinet:
Without Kup, Moore's cause would have been far weaker. No
reader of the Chicago Sun Times . . . could have failed to know
what the next move in the Crump case would be. Kup was one
jump ahead of everyone else .... His live At Random program
with Crump at County Jail . . . evoked hundreds of letters favor-
ing mercy for Crump. All of these letters were forwarded to Gov-
ernor Kerner.74
The Crump case attracted much attention from the news
media, and sympathetic feature stories were published in several
nationwide magazines. Referring to Crump as "minister to the
sick, protector of the weak, and keeper of the conscience of men
who have no conscience," one major magazine rhetorically asked:
Is not that Paul Crump, who was convicted and sentenced, already
dead? And has not a new soul risen in this same flesh, a soul devoid
of the capacity of killing, a mature man ready to make positive con-
tributions to that society which the other man offended, a human
70 Scott, The Pardoning Power, 284 Annals 95 (1952), reprinted in Newman, Source-
book on Probation, Parole and Pardon 41, 46 (1958).
71 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 174 (1964).
72 "Parole and Pardon Board Chairman Kinney says the public pressure on the Board
during the Crump case was tremendous. He says the Board has two file cabinets full of
thousands of letters urging the Board to spare Crump's life. The Board has another file
full of letters condemning the Board for its recommendation of mercy." Callaway, Donald
Page Moore: The New Clarence Darrow?, Chicago Scene Magazine, June 1963 & July 1965.
73 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 172 (1964).
74 Callaway, supra note 72, at 32.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
being whose predestined execution by the State of Illinois would
be nothing short of murder with malice aforethought?75
Concerned individuals and groups were active along with the news
media in the mounting save-Crump crusade. One weekly news
magazine reported:
Illinois Governor Otto Kerner has been besieged by requests for
clemency from the likes of Billy Graham, Father Charles Dismas
Clark (the "hoodlum priest"), state representatives, the former
warden of San Quentin prison, the former county sheriff, a host
of lawyers, sociologists, and teachers. Two Chicago dailies, the
American and the News, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, have
weighed in with strong editorial support for mercy.... By unani-
mous agreement, 300 Chicago ministers sermoned their flocks on
salvation for the convicted killer. 76
The apparent importance of media attention and community
pressure in a clemency case is underlined by an analysis of the
treatment given Dukes. While the media seemingly had an un-
favorable effect on Ciucci and a favorable effect upon Crump, they
were uninterestedly neutral in the Dukes case. Dukes' clemency
appeal came close behind that of Crump-mere weeks later. In
the Crump case there had been so much pressure, so much pub-
licity, that, according to Attorney Jason Bellows, Dukes was com-
pletely overshadowed. There was more than reporting in the
Crump case-there were feature stories and editorials. Bellows
reasons that after the exhaustive treatment given to Crump, the
subject of commutation of the death sentence merely ceased to be
newsworthy to any appreciable extent. Thus, while neutral in
posture, the media really did little for Dukes. And the community
had likewise spent its interest and emotion on Crump, and conse-
quently had little reserve upon which to draw for Dukes.
Nevertheless, Mr. Bellows believes that the news media can
serve a valuable function. The fact that they may at times misuse
their power does not necessarily mean that they should keep out
of these cases altogether. Contrast this view to that of George
Leighton, who seems to me rather critical of the press. He believes
that the press injects itself into these cases and improperly in-
fluences the results, that the media draw upon false and irrational
75 Ebony Magazine, July 27, 1962, p. 31.
76 Time, July 20, 1962, p. 22.
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standards with no understanding of the law. "Why," he asks,
"should they clamor for commutation for X and death for Y?"
Executive clemency campaigns in death penalty cases ap-
parently tend to become somewhat merged with the movement
to abolish capital punishment. The abolition groups initiate direct
public action campaigns for commutation. They seek to inform
the public and gain its support with respect to individual com-
mutation cases. The working philosophy may be somewhat akin
to that of a political lobbying organization. They may conduct
campaigns by distributing handbills, writing press releases, ad-
vising people of pending commutation hearings and requesting
those interested to send letters, telegrams, and petitions to the
governor.
77
The active membership of the current save-Witherspoon
crusade seems to be an admixture of capital punishment abolition-
ists and believers in Witherspoon the man. The Citizens for
Witherspoon Committee has plunged directly into the arena of
community action in an effort to arouse community opinion and
consequently bring pressure to bear upon Governor Kerner. They
have distributed petitions; they have urged concerned persons to
write the Governor; they have appealed to various civic and
church groups. But the Committee has indicated its particular dis-
appointment with the lack of positive response on the part of the
organized churches and the civil rights groups as well, especially
since their potential influence is so great.
The Committee has been concerned with gaining access to
the news media. The feeling seems to be that while the press has
devoted less attention to Witherspoon than was given to Crump,
nevertheless they have been quite fair in presenting Witherspoon's
side of the story. Some college newspapers in the Chicago area
have taken up the cause, and a limited amount of coverage has
been obtained on Chicago radio and television.
The fundamental problem that emerges for the Committee
is how to reach more of the public, how to attract more interest
and thereby broaden the base of support for the commutation
movement?
77 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 174-175 (1964).
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INSULATING FACTORS
In solitude he must resolve each case and alone he must face the
judgment of the people... .78
Where the governor assumes ultimate responsibility for the
clemency decision, he must take on an awesome power and a diffi-
cult task. "He must become the conscience of the people of his
state. ' 79 But need he necessarily sustain such a heavy burden?
Theoretically, there is no strict adherence to precedent as a
standard for determining whether commutation should be granted.
The employment of standards of general applicability is thought
to be incompatible with the singular nature of the clemency deci-
sion. 0 However, one writer has pointed out that:
Despite these assertions, one wonders whether clemency authori-
ties do not feel compelled to rely to some degree on precedent, for
to decide every case on an ad hoc basis, particularly for the gov-
ernor who must decide alone, is to bear a heavier burden than need
be borne: Precedent shields those who must decide .... 81
One also wonders to what extent the statutorily required re-
commendations of the prosecutor and trial judge affords the gov-
ernor an opportunity partially to relieve himself of the lonesome
duty of arriving at a life-or-death clemency decision.
Consider, too, whether the governor, subconsciously or other-
wise, permits himself to share his awesome responsibility by un-
duly relying upon the recomendations and conclusions of the State
Parole and Pardon Board. The significance of this decisional factor
must remain the object of some speculation in Illinois, however,
for the Board's advisory reports to the governor are not a matter
of public record. Therefore, no positive assertions properly may
be offered with regard to the governor's reliance upon the Board's
advisory report in his constitutional action upon any given case.
CONCLUSION
Executive clemency subserves as a vehicle for the expression
of society's compassion, as an outlet from the rigorous inflexibility
of a judicial system. This mobile institution has assumed telling
78 Gov. Stratton, Report on Leopold Decision (July 30, 1957).
79 Harriman, Mercy is a Lonely Business, Saturday Evening Post, vol. 230, no. 38,
p. 24, 84 (1958).
80 Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 136, 176-177 (1964).
81 Id. at 177.
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significance in the historic development of the criminal law.82
And today, operating within its proper sphere, executive clemency
continues to fulfill a meaningful role in the operation of the
criminal process.
It would seem vital to the proper functioning of the clemency
device that the reasons and influencing factors, both assigned and
unassigned, which relate to a decision, be sound and rational. The
spotlight of publicity is constantly focused upon the governor, and
by injudicious use of the power of clemency he could not only
expose himself to severe criticism, but might also bring the institu-
tion of discretionary executive clemency into disrepute and reduce
it to an instrument of little meaning, or even of harm. Thus, the
all-importance of sound, well-founded decisional considerations in
the clemency process, especially in capital cases where community
emotions are often at their highest.
Interviews reveal a certain dissatisfaction with the decisional
soundness of executive clemency. It would seem that much of the
clemency process revolves about somewhat unpredictable patterns
of interdependent variables. Human factors seem to become mixed
with political factors. There is much publicity, public pressure,
and emotionalism-all of which tend to divert the governor's at-
tention from the merits of the particular case. Indeed, clemency
decisions in capital cases have been characterized as "often fortui-
tous and discriminatory.
'8 8
Certain troublesome patterns seem to suggest themselves, from
an analysis of the referent Illinois commutation cases. It seems that
much depends upon mere luck! What kind of attorney happens to
be appointed by the state? How zealous is he in delaying execution
through legal maneuvers and in generating publicity and public
pressure? Of what logical relevance to life and death is a public
relations campaign?
What about rehabilitation? How about the condemned man
who is not able to delay his execution and thereby receive a bonus
of time in which to "rehabilitate" himself and attract community
82 The law of insanity, self-defense, compulsion, and improved treatment for juvenile
offenders developed from the practice of exercising clemency in those cases where rigid
application of the then existing criminal law seemed undesirable. 3 Attorney General's
Survey of Release Procedures-Pardon 52 (1939).
88 Address by Norval Morris, Chicago Maroon Forum on Capital Punishment
(Feb. 18, 1965).
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sympathy? And how about the individual who is not so intelligent
and capable as to react positively to prison society? Should he be
placed at a disadvantage? How about the man who is not able to
compose or write, one who does not achieve or communicate to the
extent of attracting the attention of influential persons with access
to the news media? Is there a tendency to confuse artistic crea-
tivity and the ability to articulate with rehabilitation? Is it true
that "everyone gets a little religion on Death Row"?
And what of timing? Why should a man be put at a dis-
advantage merely because his case is overshadowed by a recent
cause celebre, where news value and community interest were ex-
hausted? Of what relevance to the question of life or death is the
factor of temporal fortuity?
Notwithstanding dissatisfaction with these troublesome deci-
sional patterns, however, it would be somewhat remiss to suggest
any diminishing of the importance of executive clemency, es-
pecially in capital cases. For as long as capital punishment exists,
the discretionary power of the executive to grant clemency is




ARTICLE V. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
§ 13. The Governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commuta-
tions, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, subject to
such regulations as may be provided in law relative to the manner
of applying therefor.
APPENDIX II
PARDON AcT (ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 104V)
APPLICATIONS
AN AcT to regulate the manner of applying for pardons, reprieves and
commutations. Approved May 31, 1879. (Chapter 104V, Illinois Revised
Statutes, 1961.)
APPLICATION FOR PARDON-HOW MADE. Section 1. Be it enacted by the
People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That
hereafter all applications for reprieves, commutations and pardons shall be
made by petition in writing to the Governor, signed by the party under
conviction, or other persons in his behalf, which petition shall contain a
brief history of the case and the reasons why such pardon should be granted;
and shall also be accompanied by a statement in writing made by the judge
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and prosecuting attorney of the court in which the conviction was had;
stating the opinion of said judge and prosecuting attorney in regard to the
same, or satisfactory reasons shall be given to the Governor, why such state-
ments of the judge and prosecuting attorney, or either of them, do not
accompany such petition; and it shall be the duty of such judge and prose-
cuting attorney to give such opinion, whenever such petition shall be
presented to them.
NOTICE. Section 2. Notice of the proposed application shall be given by
publication for three weeks prior thereto, in a newspaper published in the
county where the conviction was had, a duly certified copy of which notice
shall accompany said petition; Provided, the Governor may dispense with
publication of notice, when in his judgment justice or humanity requires it.
BOARD OF PARDONS
AN ACT in relation to pardons and the commutation of sentences.
Approved June 5, 1897. Title as amended by Act approved June 29, 1943.
RULES AND REGULATIONS-RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS. Section 4. The Depart-
ment of Public Safety shall make all such rules and regulations for the
orderly conduct of its business, as may be deemed necessary. The Depart-
ment shall cause proper records to be kept in its office of its acts and proceed-
ings, and shall hear all applications for pardons and for the commutations
of sentences in the order in which they are filed; but the Department may
take up any application out of its regular order, where the exigencies of the
case require it.
PETITIONS FOR -PARDONS-HEARING-NOTICE. Section 5. All petitions and
requests for pardons and commutations shall be addressed to the Governor,
and, as to form, accompanying statements, publications of notices, etc.,
shall be governed by the Act of May 31, 1879, entitled, "An Act to regulate
the manner of applying for pardons, reprieves and commutations," except
that the three weeks' notice provided in that Act to be given shall have
reference to the hearing before the Department of Public Safety, and not the
Governor; and every such petition or request shall, before its actual presen-
tation to the Governor, be filed and kept in the office of the Department
of Public Safety for the preliminary action of the Department.
MEETINGS OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OR OFFICER DESIGNATED. Sec-
tion 6. The regular meeting of the Department of Public Safety, or of the
officer or agency of the Department designated by the Director thereof, shall
be held on the second Tuesday of the months of January, April, July and
October in each year, and special meetings may be called at any time by
the Governor, or the Director of the Department.
HEARING OF APPLICATIONS-REPORT TO GOVERNOR. Section 7. The Depart-
ment of Public Safety shall, upon due public notice, give a full hearing to
each application for pardon or commutation filed with it, allowing rep-
resentation by counsel, if desired, after which it shall, without publicity,
make report upon each case to the Governor, accompanying such report
with the original petition and all accompanying papers and documents, and
in such report shall be embodied the conclusions and recommendations of
the Department, with its reasons therefor, briefly stated. The report to the
Governor shall be advisory to him in his constitutional action upon the case.
RECORD TO BE KEPT-DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY NOT TO ACT AS COURT
OF REVIEW. Section 8. A full record of the report and recommendation made
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in each case shall be kept in the office of the Department of Public Safety.
The Department shall in no case act as a court of review to pass upon the
correctness, regularity or legality of the proceedings in the trial court which
resulted in conviction, but shall confine itself to a hearing and consideration
of those matters only which properly bear upon the propriety of extending
clemency by the Governor.
GOVERNOR MAY HEAR APPLICATION FOR REPRIEVE IN CASE OF DEATH
SENTENCES. Section 9. This Act shall not deprive the Governor of the right
to hear any application made directly to him for a reprieve of a death
sentence where the exigencies of the case require such reprieve in order to
give the Department of Public Safety the time and opportunity to properly
investigate the case.
APPENDIX III
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY RULES GOVERNING APPLICATIONS
FOR PARDON AND COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE
The Department of Public Safety of the State of Illinois, by Joseph E.
Ragen, Director, having heretofore designated the Parole and Pardon Board
as the agency to hear petitions for pardons, reprieves and commutations of
sentence and make reports to the Governor, does hereby adopt and promul-
gate the following rules and regulations governing petitions for pardon
and commutations of sentence.
1. All applications for pardons, reprieves and commutations of sentence
shall be made by petition, in quintuplicate, addressed to the Governor and
filed in the office of the Parole and Pardon Board at Springfield at least
twenty days prior to the succeeding regular meeting of the Pardon Board,
and conform to the following requirements:
(A) The petition shall be signed by the applicant or other person
in his behalf.
(B) If signed by another person, the full address of such person
shall be given, and his interest in the applicant stated.
(C) Each petition shall contain a brief history of the case, a brief
biography of the petitioner, setting forth his full and correct name, any
aliases he has been convicted under, his age, place of birth, the different
places where he has resided, the years of residence in each place, the
occupations pursued in each locality, and the reasons why a pardon or
commutation of sentence should be granted.
2. Each original petition shall be accompanied by a statement in writ-
ing made by the Judge and Prosecuting Attorney of the court in which the
conviction was had, stating the opinion of the Judge and Prosecuting State's
Attorney in regard to the same, or satisfactory reasons shall be given why
such statement of either of them does not accompany the petition. Copies
of the petition shall be furnished to the said Trial Judge, Prosecuting State's
Attorney and present State's Attorney in each case if they are available; and
proof thereof may be made by a receipt of such official, or affidavit that it
was delivered, or a registered receipt of the United States Post Office if
sent by registered mail. Such proof of service shall accompany the petition.
3. Notice of the hearings on all petitions shall be given by publication,
as required by Statute, for three successive weeks prior thereto in a news-
paper published in the county where the petitioner was convicted; and a
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certificate of such publication must accompany the petition, unless the
Governor dispenses with such publication.
4. The published notice shall contain the name of the person convicted,
the fact that he is applying for a pardon or commutation of sentence, the
date of sentence, the crime of which he was convicted, the nature of the
sentence, the court in which he was sentenced, and the term of the Pardon
Board to which the petition is being filed.
5. A copy of the published notice of the application for pardon or com-
mutation of sentence shall be given to the present State's Attorney of the
county in which the applicant was convicted; and if he is not the State's
Attorney who prosecuted the applicant, a copy of the petition shall be
served on the duly elected prosecuting State's Attorney. Proof of the service
of notice and copy of the petition shall accompany the original petition.
6. A copy of the published notice of application for pardon or commu-
tation of sentence shall also be served on the complaining witness at least
twenty days before the date of hearing, and proof of such service shall be
attached to the original petition.
If the complaining witness cannot be found upon diligent inquiry, an
affidavit setting forth the efforts made to locate the witness shall be attached
to the original petition.
7. At the quarterly meetings of the Pardon Board counsel for ap-
plicants, as well as others who appear in their behalf and those who appear
in opposition, will be heard.
8. At each quarterly meeting as aforesaid, a docket shall be prepared
listing all petitions which comply with the Statutes and these Rules, and
shall have been filed in apt time. Counsel and those who wish to be heard in
favor of or in opposition to the respective petitions on the call of the docket,
must register in Room 223, State Office Bldg., 400 So. Spring St., in Spring-
field. The cases will be called in the order of registration. Public hearings
will be held in Room 219.
9. The Pardon Board shall in no case act as a court of review to pass
upon the correctness, regularity or legality of the proceedings in the trial
court which resulted in conviction, but shall confine itself to a hearing and
consideration of those matters only which properly bear upon the propriety
of extending clemency by the Governor.
APPENDIX IV
Springfield, Ill., Aug. 1-Gov. Otto Kerner today issued the following
statement:
"I have today commuted the sentence imposed upon Paul Crump from
death to imprisonment for a term of 199 years, without parole.
"In doing so, I am fully aware of the responsibility of my action. It is
admitted in the petition for executive clemency that Paul Crump was fairly
tried and convicted, having received the full process of law accorded by our
judicial system. Yet the Constitution of Illinois grants to the Governor the
power of executive clemency to be exercised in exceptional cases. This is
such a case.
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"In any capital case, there can be no easy decision. Every possible factor
must be evaluated before a final decision is made.
"I am personally opposed to capital punishment. My personal convic-
tions, however, will not predetermine my actions in a request for commuta-
tion in a capital case.
"It does not follow, however, that every request for clemency must be
denied. To take that position would be to abrogate the power which was
consciously and deliberately invested in the Governor.
"The most significant goal of a system of penology in a civilized society
is the rehabilitation of one of its members who, for a variety of complex
reasons, has violated the laws of the society. If that premise were to be
denied, solely because it is a capital case, a great disservice would be done
to what we hopefully embrace as the ultimate goal of this system.
"What has troubled me is how the concept of rehabilitation can be
judged and evaluated in a case where the process of law, after the extensive
review permitted every defendant by our concern for justice, has determined
that a man committed a crime so repugnant as to merit a sentence of death.
"I do not suggest that by my decision in this case I have totally resolved
this dilemma, nor that I can set forth standards so universal as to lead to an
inevitable conclusion in the next case.
"We must, however, be able to hold forth to others the hope that they
can look forward to a useful life-to life itself-if they will make the neces-
sary effort to face squarely their past actions and the alternatives.
"Before me is a voluminous record of testimony and affidavits from
almost all of the people who have had any association with Paul Crump
since his imprisonment nine years ago. This record is virtually unanimous
that the embittered, distorted man who committed a vicious murder no
longer exists. Rather, the record speaks eloquently of the degree of intro-
spection, the maturity of judgment and of values he has achieved, and of
the genuine contribution he has made, and can continue to make, as a
human being even in his restricted environment. Within this framework,
Paul Crump must be accepted as rehabilitated.
"Under these circumstances, it would serve no useful purpose to society
to take this man's life. The power of clemency entrusted to the Governor
permits giving effect to this judgment.
"This consideration, however, can never be entirely free of doubt, for
the real test for Paul Crump lies ahead. The years he must face in prison
will serve as a true test of his willingness and ability to be of service to his
fellow man."
APPENDIX V
BEFORE THE PAROLE AND PARDON BOARD OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
In the matter of
WILLIAM WITHERSPOON
PETITION FOR COMMUTATION OF DEATH SENTENCE
TO THE HONORABLE OTTO KERNER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:
Your petitioner, William Witherspoon, respectfully seeks the grant of
your Excellency's clemency in order that his sentence of death may be com-
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muted to any term of years the facts and circumstances warrant, and in
support thereof submits the following:
A PREFATORY NOTE OF URGENT IMPORTANCE
After what appeared to be the termination of the federal and state
proceedings in this matter, counsel for Witherspoon petitioned the Illinois
Supreme Court for an indefinite stay of execution on the grounds that it
was necessary for new counsel, Mr. Elmer Gertz, to acquaint himself with
the record in order to prepare, file and present argument on a petition
for executive clemency. The court thereupon re-set the execution date to
March 19, 1965. Pursuant to the representation made by counsel to the
Supreme Court, this petition is accordingly filed.
It is necessary, however, to point out that since application was made
to the Illinois Supreme Court other United States District Court appointed
counsel are pursuing a new habeas corpus proceeding in the United States
District Court. Because of the seriousness and scope of that effort, we cannot
state at this time as to how prolonged it will be, and we must assume that
it may succeed, making this petition for executive clemency then unneces-
sary. This petition is filed now without prejudice to the said habeas corpus
proceeding, and it is our suggestion and prayer that the hearing hereon be
postponed and that, meanwhile, the Governor exercise his statutory right
to grant a stay or reprieve, pending the disposition of the said habeas corpus
proceeding and this petition for executive clemency.
At a subsequent time it may be incumbent upon counsel to file an
amended petition for executive clemency or a supplement thereto and a
memorandum of law and fact in support thereof. Leave to file the same is
hereby prayed.
REASONS WHY THE GOVERNOR SHOULD DISPENSE
WITH PUBLICATION OF NOTICE
By Statute, applications for commutation of death sentence should be
published in a newspaper for three weeks prior to the filing of the applica-
tion (Chapter 104-V2, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1963). The same statute, section 2
thereof, provides that "... . the governor may dispense with publication of
notice, when in his judgment, justice or humanity requires it." By order of
the Supreme Court of Illinois entered on January 15, 1965, the execution
of the death sentence has been stayed, pending an application to your Ex-
cellency for a commutation of the death sentence, to March 19, 1965. To
require three weeks' notice of publication would unfairly delay any hear-
ings which your Excellency might order to be held. The State's Attorney
of Cook County, Illinois, is served a copy of this petition and the next of
kin of the deceased is also served through the office of the State's Attorney
in accordance with the suggestion of assistant State's Attorney Elmer Kissane,
the chief of the criminal appeals section, and the assistant State's Attorney
who has handled this case through all of the court proceedings.
This application is further made in accordance with Section 9 of Chap-
ter 104-V2, which states:
This Act shall not deprive the Governor of the right to hear any
application made directly to him for a reprieve of a death sentence
where the exigencies of the case require such reprieve in order to
give the Department of Public Safety the time and opportunity to
properly investigate the case.
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Attached hereto is an affidavit of service of this petition upon the State's
Attorney of Cook County, and upon the next of kin. No service can be had
upon the trial judge, he now being deceased.
HISTORY OF THE CASE
It is charged that on April 29, 1959, petitioner, William Witherspoon,
shot and killed Chicago police officer, Mitchall Stone, who was in the act
of arresting Witherspoon at about 4:30 in the morning (Abst. 11, 25, 55).
Shortly thereafter, Witherspoon was arrested. He was taken to police head-
quarters at 11 th and State Street, Chicago, where he was interrogated.
In the trial in his cause in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Wither-
spoon contended that his purported confession was extorted from him by
brutal beatings and by threats of death against him by the interrogating
police officers. This is one of the subjects of the pending habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.
It was petitioner's trial testimony that the shooting had been ac-
cidental, that he had tried to hand the gun to Officer Stone who fired a
shot at him, and that petitioner's gun had discharged accidentally as he
jumped back (A. 127). It is contended that the gun was a defective foreign
make.
The petitioner, being indigent, had court-appointed counsel in the trial
of the cause and has been represented by court-appointed counsel through-
out all of the proceedings, including this one.
The petitioner had requested that the jury pass only upon the question
of guilt or innocence and that the court determine the punishment, but the
court denied this request.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and fixed the punishment at
death. (This proceeding was permissible at that time. Since then, effective
January 1, 1963, the jury has no right to fix the punishment and a hearing
in mitigation before the judge is required in all cases. See Section 1-7(g),
Chapter 38, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963). There has never been a hearing in mitiga-
tion.
After Witherspoon's conviction, the Supreme Court of Illinois ap-
pointed counsel and an appeal was taken to that court. In March, 1963,
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and a petition for rehearing was
denied on May 22, 1963 (People v. Witherspoon, 27 Ill. 2d 483). No petition
for certiorari with respect to this case was ever filed with the United States
Supreme Court.
Thereafter, on September 11, 1963, the Supreme Court of Illinois ap-
pointed new counsel, who filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
No. 63 C 1812 in the District Court in Chicago. Because Witherspoon had
not exhausted his state remedies, he filed in the trial court his post-convic-
tion petition which was denied in November, 1963, and an original writ
of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court which was likewise denied in
November, 1963. He filed an appeal from the denial of his post-conviction
petition to the Supreme Court of Illinois (No. 1308), and in an unpublished
opinion the Supreme Court of Illinois denied the writ of error on the post-
conviction petition on January 17, 1964.
Thereafter, hearings were held in the District Court for the Northern
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District of Illinois, Judge James B. Parsons presiding, and on March 24,
1964, Judge Parsons, ruling on the then pending petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, ruled that the sentence of death as set by the jury was un-
constitutional in that it did not permit the petitioner to present evidence in
mitigation to the sentencing authority.
The State then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
from that part of Judge Parsons' order (No. 14595) and Witherspoon cross-
appealed from certain orders (No. 14597). The Court of Appeals, in an
opinion on September 28, 1964, reversed the judgment of Judge Parsons
and affirmed in all other respects the conviction and sentence (United States
ex rel. Witherspoon v. Illinois, - F.2d -).
Petition for a writ of certiorari on this (but not the original conviction)
was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States to the October, 1964
Term, No. 602 Misc., and the petition was denied without opinion on
December 14, 1964.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has stayed the execution of the death
sentence to March 19, 1965, permitting your Excellency to consider and to
rule upon his petition for a commutation of the death sentence.
Since then a new proceeding for habeas corpus has been filed and is
now pending.
PERSONAL BIOGRAPHY OF PETITIONER
Petitioner was born in Detroit, Michigan on January 31, 1924. His
mother died when he was two years of age and he was raised by his grand-
mother until he joined the United States Navy at the age of seventeen, in
January, 1941. When war broke out, he was a member of the Asiatic fleet
stationed in the Far East. He participated in active combat with the Navy
in various war zones in the Pacific. Petitioner was aboard ship for about
eighteen months when the ship returned to the United States at San
Francisco. Together with many others from the ship, he was absent without
leave. Given a general court marshal, petitioner was returned to duty on
eighteen months' probation. While stationed in Hawaii, he was twenty-
four hours over leave and was subsequently given a bad conduct discharge.
Petitioner returned home to Detroit, Michigan, where he became a
truck driver. For stealing a car, he received a sentence of one to five years
at the penitentiary in Jackson, Michigan, received a parole and satisfactor-
ily was discharged on the parole. He again worked as a truck driver and as
a part time re-write man for the Detroit Times.
Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to a charge of grand larceny and re-
ceived a sentence of from two to five years in prison. While on parole, he
committed an act called gross indecency with a woman and received a
sentence of three to five years and was returned to the penitentiary at
Jackson, Michigan.
After his discharge, petitioner was in no trouble for a period of five
years. He then committed offenses in Detroit and left that city for Chicago.
While in Chicago four days he had met a woman in a tavern with whom
he had a dispute. It was as a result of this dispute that Officer Stone sought
to arrest the petitioner, with the consequences as hereinbefore described. At
this time, petitioner had not committed, nor was he in the process of
committing, any crime.
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Petitioner was married in the Philippine Islands during the war. His
wife was killed there in bombing raids. He subsequently married again and
was divorced. His former wife's three daughters by a prior marriage still
correspond with him.
With respect to the conduct of Witherspoon since his incarceration in
the County Jail and the remarkable change in his character, Witherspoon
himself has written to counsel, and his own words have a special signifi-
cance:
Since coming to the jail I have begun writing, mostly for
magazines. I am also at work on a novel. My writing has gathered
many friends; among them staunch supporters who see something
in my work-that there is a realism that captures them. I answer
most of the letters that come in as a result of my writing and have
found only a few of these to be in any way against me-those are
usually unsigned.
My job here is on the ABO, a hospital outpatient tier, where
I have charge in the capacity of inmate "barn boss." Here we care
for the aged, the diabetic, heart, ulcer and psycho patients. Here
we house the stool pidgeons, the red tags, the guys who could get
along nowhere else in the jail. I do not run this tier with "force,"
but rather with kindness and understanding. I am sure that Ulette
Goodloe, the head nurse, will tell you that this unit now runs
smoother than it ever has in the past.
Many of my nights are spent with sick inmates; getting them
medication and doctors when necessary. Often I have to set aside
my own work to sit down with some kid who is scared, or some old
timer who decided he no longer has anything he wants to live
for .... I guess I am the only man who walks into the cell of one
of these psycho inmates and calms him down with words and
understanding. I talk them out of knives they have fashioned from
spoon handles and bits of tin from their cups .... For some reason
I can get thru to these men and they form a trust toward me they
do not possess for anyone else. Perhaps if a jail officer walked in
on one of them he would get cut, I don't know, but I think this is
a strong-a very strong possibility .... This tier is an exacting job
and you have to exert a great deal of energy. You must be father
to those who need it; friend to those who never had one; in short
you have to know how-and when-to apply psychology. I would
say there is less racial tension here than anywhere else in the jail
because it is a rule that anyone who works with me in the running
of the tier must treat everyone equal-not only his race and re-
ligion, but his crime status is obscured by the way he treats those
around him while here. In other words, an ex-cop is as safe here
against all prejudice as any one of us.
There is no compensation for this job, other than the knowl-
edge that you are doing something to benefit others. I have had
some inmates go out of here and write back saying they were using
their friendship for me as a strength that kept them away from
crime; away from narcotics . . . . Parents have written me saying
their boy spoke of me when he got home and they wanted to thank
me for all I have done for their sons ....
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Often, you see, young inmates, attacked by homosexuals up-
stairs, are put down here for safe keeping. They are scared kids
until they learn that I do not tolerate the things down here that
take place in other areas of this jungle. Then they are at ease, and
can regain their balance and self-respect. I argue for their rights,
and argue them down when they are wrong ....
My name and my word commands respect among the inmates
and among the officials. I have never broken my word to any man.
My mailing list includes about 350 names; to some of whom I
merely send Xmas cards once a year; others about 150, I write
sporadically,. and about 50 are my regular correspondents. There
just is not time to reply to too many letters and to write for the
magazines also. The articles, I have been told, give people an in-
sight into this sort of place and into the people who inhabit it.
Among my friends, acquired since coming here, are sons, daughters
and brothers of policemen.
I have tried to set an image of the condemned prisoner while
here that would off-set the stereo-type. So I have co-operated with
members of the press and other news media, for I felt people had
a right to know how and what I feel at this penalty ....
These and other aspects of his rehabilitation will be covered more
fully in the hearing before the Board, through the testimony of witnesses
and documentation.
REASONS WHY COMMUTATION SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THE
CASE OF WILLIAM WITHERSPOON
I. In an executive clemency proceeding, the Board and the Governor
are not restricted by technical rules as may be a trial court or a
reviewing tribunal. The courts, confronted by a jury verdict, are
limited in what they may consider in order to set aside the verdict;
the Board and Governor may act in accordance with the dictates
of conscience, public welfare and justice, regardless of any legal
technicalities.
II. In a capital case, the defendant ought not to suffer the final
penalty because he cannot legally avail himself of the advantages
afforded by changes in the law since his conviction. In an executive
clemency hearing, such changes should be applied to defendant.
III. Petitioner was deprived of rights that defendants in his position
now receive as a matter of course, including:
(a) A determination by a jury confined to the sole issue of
guilt;
(b) A hearing in mitigation prior to adjudication of punish-
ment;
(c) The opportunity to petition the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari in connection with the original case.
IV. Despite the jury verdict against him, the reasonable conclusion
should have been drawn that the shooting was accidental, and not
premeditated and not with malice aforethought, for the following
reasons, among others:
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(a) Petitioner was not in the act of committing a crime;
(b) Technically, he was not a fugitive;
(c) There was no reason, good or bad, for the shooting;
(d) The gun was not his and he was not familiar with it;
(e) The gun was mechanically imperfect and capable of going
off accidentally;
(f) Petitioner claims he was in the process of surrendering the
gun to the police officer when it went off accidentally;
(g) Petitioner did not intend to shoot the police officer.
V. At worst (assuming the killing was not accidental), the crime was an
act of panic, not of premeditation.
VI. This community, like the rest of the nation, is divided on the
subject of capital punishment; more persons being opposed to it
than in favor. Yet all those opposed to capital punishment were
excluded from the jury. Thus, there was not a representative jury,
but one slanted in favor of the death penalty.
VII. There is serious question as to the admissibility, voluntariness and
propriety of the claimed confession. Circumstances surrounding
the confession make the death sentence inappropriate in any event.
VIII. The jury might have imposed a lesser penalty on defendant but
for evidence collateral to the chief issue prejudicial to defendant
and the rejection of significant evidence tendered by defendant.
IX. A study of homicide cases contemporaneous to that of the de-
fendant indicates that almost all defendants received a life sentence
(or equivalent).
X. The orderly processes of the administration of criminal justice are
hampered by capital punishment.
XI. The supreme, irrevocable penalty of death, if invoked at all,
should be reserved for the vicious and depraved. Petitioner is
neither vicious nor depraved; there is abundant and irrefutable
evidence that he is a person of great potentiality for social useful-
ness. His intimate knowledge of crime, his powers of observation,
his articulateness and his desire to be of public service should be
utilized in the study of ways and means of preventing crime and
rehabilitating prisoners.
XII. Since only three murderers out of the thousands convicted of mur-
der have been executed in the last twelve years in Illinois, it is
clear that only as a matter of fortuitousness, or chance, is any one
executed in Illinois. It is, therefore, morally and, perhaps, legally
wrong to execute any one in Illinois. Such execution constitutes,
in a real sense at this time in history, cruel and unusual punish-
ment and deprivation of due process.
XIII. The capital punishment law (like witchcraft laws) having become
virtually a dead-letter law, the Governor and the Board should
courageously recognize that fact, and not be intimidated by the
opinion of the unenlightened and vindictive.
XIV. Having gone through the agony of years in jail while awaiting
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
execution and the further agony of the ups and downs of legal
proceedings and numerous last minute stays of execution, peti-
tioner has already been subjected to the emotional equivalent of
the death penalty, and it would be barbaric to execute him at this
time.
XV. The Illinois General Assembly, in common with legislatures
throughout this and other countries, is presently considering the
abolition of the death penalty, and it is believed that such legisla-
tion may be enacted. It is morally wrong to execute any one while
the enactment of such legislation is probable or even possible.
XVI. Informed men and women in all walks of life have urged executive
clemency. These include many leaders of the community.
XVII. Petitioner is so completely rehabilitated that his execution at this
time would outrage the public conscience and discourage the prin-
ciple of rehabilitation generally.
XVIII. In the opinions of those best acquainted with the petitioner-the
Sheriff and the County Jail personnel and those who have been
in close contact with him since his conviction-petitioner has dem-
onstrated qualities that justify the extending of mercy to him.
XIX. There is pending in the United States District Court a new habeas
corpus proceeding. In any event, petitioner's life should be spared
pending the final determination of that proceeding.
Petitioner will supplement this application with a memorandum as
to the applicable law and facts.
In the circumstances set forth in this petition, the full ends of justice
are served by the incarceration of petitioner, not by his execution.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, commutation of this death sentence should be
granted in the interest of justice.
Respectfully submitted,
JULIUS Lucius ECHELES
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